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School violence has recently become a central concern among teachers, students, students' parents and 
policymakers. Violence can induce behaviors on educational agents that go against the goals of 
improving the quality of education and increasing school attendance. In fact, there is evidence that 
school environmental characteristics and student performance and behavior at school are related. 
Although school violence may have a direct impact on students’ performance, such impact has not yet 
been quantified. In this paper, we investigate this issue using Brazilian data and show that, on average, 
students who attended more violent schools had worse proficiency on a centralized test carried out by 
the Brazilian Ministry of Education, even when we controlled for school, class, teachers and student 
characteristics. We also show that school violence affects more the students from the bottom of the 
proficiency distribution. Furthermore, we find out that besides the direct effect on student proficiency, 
it seems that school violence has an indirect effect on it operating through teacher turnover. Indeed, we 
show that the occurrence of violent episodes in a school decreases the probability of a class in that 
school having only one teacher during the academic year, and increases the probability of that class 
having more than one teacher (teacher turnover). 
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Recently, teachers, students, students' parents and policymakers have been extremely 
worried about school violence. This concern is fair, since violence can induce some kinds of 
behavior on educational agents, which go against the goals of improving the quality of 
education and increasing school attendance. In fact, there is psychological evidence that 
school environmental characteristics and student performance and behavior at school are very 
related (Haller, 1992; Fowler and Walberg, 1991; Pittman and Haughwout, 1987), and that 
exposure to violence in the neighborhood and emotional and behavioral outcomes in children 
and youth are closely connected (Bowen and Bowen, 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 
1997; Berton and Stabb, 1996; Bowen and Chapman, 1996; Hill, Levermore, Twaite, and 
Jones, 1996; Cooley-Quille, Turner, and Beidel, 1995; Richters and Martinez, 1993). On the 
one hand, the lack of safety in schools sometimes obliges principals and teachers to reduce the 
requirements in the educational process. On the other hand, students can have difficulty 
concentrating during classes and eventually quit school. Indeed, a survey carried out by 
UNESCO in 2000 in fourteen Brazilian capitals showed that nearly half of teachers lose their 
motivation to work due to school violence, one third of them diminishes the rigorousness with 
which they lead their pedagogical activities, one fourth has difficulty concentrating and show 
unwillingness to work, and one fifth responds to the threats and/or violent events by asking to 
get transferred to another school, thus generating teacher turnover. Furthermore, roughly half 
of the students have concentration problems because of violence within and around schools, 
one third of them feels nervousness in face of violent acts and, finally, one third reacts with 
unwillingness to go to school. 
Although school violence directly affects human capital accumulation, its effects on 
student performance has almost not been studied. Neither the literature on educational 
production function nor the literature on the economic consequences of crime have mentioned 
the effects of school violence on student achievement. The main reason is the lack of data. 
Grogger (1997) was the pioneer in analyzing the effects of school violence on economic 
outcomes. This author showed that that violence had important effects: moderate levels of 
violence reduced the likelihood of high school graduation by 5.1 percent and diminished the 
probability that a student would attend college by 6.9 percent. Lazear (2001) studied this issue 
theoretically and showed that the presence of disruptive students in a classroom could reduce 
the performance of their peers. Figlio (2005) and Kinsler (2006) found evidence supporting 




In this paper, we take advantage of the SAEB 2003, a unique dataset provided by the 
Brazilian Ministry of Education which contains indicators of violence within and around 
schools and educational variables, to give evidence of the direct relationship between school 
violence and student proficiency and of the indirect relation between them, which seems to 
operate through teacher turnover. We follow Grogger’s strategy for measuring violence with 
aggregate indicators. Nevertheless, while that author analyzes the impact of school violence 
on educational attainment (quantity of education), we investigate the effect of such violence 
on student proficiency (quality of education). We therefore intend to contribute to the 
understanding of school violence and to the formulation of public policies.  
Our main results indicate that students who attend more violent schools usually have a 
worse performance on proficiency tests, even when the attributes of students, classes, teachers 
and schools were controlled for. We also find evidence that violence affects more students at 
the lower tail of the proficiency distribution. Besides the direct relationship between school 
violence and proficiency, there seems to be an indirect association between these variables 
operating through increase in teacher turnover. For all these results, one should emphasize the 
deleterious effect of the presence of drugs at schools: drug dealing and/or consumption seems 
to undermine the motivation of both students and teachers. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the database and 
the main characteristics of our sample, especially concerning school violence. In Section 3, 
we explain our empirical strategy: how we construct our variables of interest and what our 
econometric model looks like. In Section 4, we present our results and, finally, we conclude 




2.1. Database and sample 
 
The data used in this study were obtained from the National Basic Education 
Evaluation System (SAEB), conducted by the National Institute of Educational Studies and 
Research Anísio Teixeira, accredited with the Brazilian Ministry of Education (INEP/MEC). 
SAEB collects information about students, teachers and school principals from a sample of 
public and private Brazilian schools every two years. Each selected student does a test – either 
on Portuguese or on Mathematics –, and answers a questionnaire about his/her study habits 




questionnaires about their profiles and their teaching practices, about management 
mechanisms and about the school’s infrastructure.  
Even though there are available data since 1995, in the present paper, we use only the 
2003 database, because it was the first one that contained information on school violence. In 
addition, we work only with public schools as violence episodes tend to occur more often in 
public schools, as shown in Table 1 by the difference of means tests for indicators of violence 
in public and private schools. In that table, each indicator shows the occurrence (1) or not (0) 
of a violent event at a given school during the academic year. Indicators of attempt on life, 
theft, robbery and physical assault consider both students and teachers as victims, as we 
believe an unsafe environment that produces distorted incentives is a result of violent actions, 
irrespectively of the victim. The indicator of presence of weapons considers the concealed 
carry of firearms and/or of stabbing weapons (knives, pocket knives, stylets, etc.) by school 
members. Finally, the indicators of presence of drugs (consumption and/or dealing) and gang 
attacks consider these events both in and out of the school environment due to the 
underreporting of violence, as explained in the subsequent section.
1 
SAEB provides information about fourth graders in elementary school, eighth graders 
in middle schools, and senior high school students. However, we focus our analysis on 
students of these two latter grades because we believe that the age range of them is the most 
susceptible to violent behaviors. In fact, according to the report issued by Rezende and Tafner 
(2005) young individuals are overrepresented among victims and offenders. In 2003, for 
instance, youngsters aged 15 to 24 years accounted for 39% of homicide victims in Brazil, 
according to the Ministry of Health database (also known as DATASUS). 
 
Table 1: Difference of means of school violence indicators 
 
Mean Test   
Variable 
Public schools Private schools Difference  EP 
Attempt on life   0.0631  0.0104  0.0527***  0.0045 
Theft   0.2928  0.1945  0.0983***  0.0113 
Robbery 0.0285  0.0177  0.0108***  0.0039 
Physical assault  0.3010  0.1440  0.1570***  0.0106 
Presence of weapons   0.2143  0.0578  0.1565***  0.0083 
Presence of  drugs  0.4573  0.2737  0.1836***  0.0126 
Gang attacks  0.1841  0.0814  0.1027***  0.0085 
          Source: SAEB 2003. 
          ***significant at 1%  **significant at 5%  *significant at 10% 
 
                                                 




After the exclusions described above, our sample of interest consists of nearly 80,000 
students, 6,000 teachers, 3,000 school groups and 1,800 schools. For our estimates, one 
should recall that observations with missing data were excluded. The original SAEB 2003 
sample consists of approximately 220,000 students, 17,000 teachers and 6,000 schools. 
 
2.2. Descriptive statistics of school violence 
 
The main concerns with violence noticed by Brazilian schools in 2003 were presence 
of drugs, physical assault, theft, carry of arms by school members and gang attacks, in this 
strict order (Table 1). Attempts on life, despite the small number of schools that reported such 
problem, are also significant owing to the severity of episodes. 
Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that indicators of school violence –our main 
variables of interest – are reported by school principals. Therefore, there are two limitations: 
planning of answers and subjective perception and notification of violence. The first 
limitation was established by Grogger (1997). He emphasizes that, on the one hand, school 
principals can answer questions strategically, by giving answers that explain students’ low 
performance, thus causing the effects of violence to be overestimated. On the other hand, 
school principals might not want to reveal the actual level of violence in their schools so that 
they are not seen as incompetent, causing the effects of violence to be underestimated.  
In a recent analysis of the survey into school violence in Brazil, Sposito (2001) affirms 
that the reports of violence by Brazilian schools vary considerably, depending on the 
predominant behavior observed in the public education system. She mentions that sometimes 
the notification of violent actions shows the probable weaknesses in pedagogical work, and 
that sometimes notification may yield additional gains to the schools, such as larger material 
and human resources or some wage benefits to the teachers that work in risky areas. Since we 
did not observe the predominant behavior in public schools, we cannot categorically state how 
measurement error in violence indicators behaves and how this influences our estimates. 
However, three violence indicators from the SAEB questionnaire are reported separately for 
school premises and for schools’ neighboring areas and, therefore, the significant difference 
in these indicators may provide evidence of notification problems. Table 2 seems to indicate 






Table 2: Violence indicators for public schools 
 
Violence indicator  Within 
school 
Around 
school  Difference SE 
Consumption of 
drugs  0.0514 0.2460  -0.1946***  0.0105 
Drug dealing  0.0282  0.1780  -0.1498***  0.0091 
Gang attacks  0.0293  0.0761  -0.0468***  0.0068 
                 Source: SAEB 2003. 
                   ***significant at 1% **significant at 5% *significant at 10% 
 
Because of that finding, our indicators of presence of drugs (consumption and/or 
dealing) and gang attacks at schools contemplate these events both within and around schools. 
In fact, it seems unreasonable that 25% of schools have drug consumption in their 
surroundings and that only 5% of them have drug consumption within their premises. 
Table 3: Violence indicators in Brazil per state – 2003
† 
 
State   Homicide 
rate 
Attempt 
on life  Theft Robbery Physical 
assault  Weapons Drugs  Gang 
attacks 
Acre  24.48 0.14  0.49  0.01  0.37 0.45  0.57  0.32 
Alagoas  35.61 0.03  0.15  0.01  0.11 0.13  0.30  0.12 
Amapá  34.59 0.23  0.46  0.07  0.47 0.52  0.43  0.30 
Amazonas  18.41 0.13  0.51  0.03  0.29 0.27  0.60  0.20 
Bahia  16.11 0.02  0.17  0.02  0.27 0.15  0.31  0.09 
Ceará  20.13 0.07  0.17  0.01  0.27 0.20  0.32  0.08 
Distrito Federal  33.88 0.28  0.63  0.05  0.50 0.50  0.77  0.41 
Espírito Santo  50.12 0.14  0.49  0.09  0.36 0.18  0.54  0.12 
Goiás  25.37 0.16  0.32  0.02  0.39 0.28  0.56  0.25 
Maranhão  13.48 0.02  0.08  0.01  0.10 0.18  0.42  0.17 
Mato Grosso  34.25 0.13  0.34  0.03  0.31 0.24  0.50  0.24 
Mato Grosso do 
Sul  32.49 0.09  0.42  0.03  0.31 0.40  0.55  0.27 
Minas Gerais  20.83 0.07  0.26  0.04  0.28 0.29  0.46  0.27 
Pará  21.35 0.08  0.34  0.02  0.25 0.18  0.48  0.20 
Paraíba  17.48 0.06  0.20  0.05  0.17 0.14  0.42  0.11 
Paraná  25.55 0.06  0.34  0.03  0.33 0.26  0.51  0.23 
Pernambuco  55.34 0.03  0.14  0.04  0.29 0.20  0.38  0.15 
Piauí  10.19 0.05  0.16  0.01  0.12 0.09  0.24  0.10 
Rio de Janeiro  52.55 0.03  0.26  0.03  0.26 0.06  0.37  0.08 
Rio Grande do 
Norte  14.02 0.04  0.30  0.05  0.29 0.23  0.44  0.15 
Rio Grande do 
Sul  18.13 0.06  0.46  0.03  0.37 0.27  0.50  0.21 
Rondônia  38.88 0.17  0.44  0.03  0.34 0.42  0.49  0.24 
Roraima  29.67 0.10  0.50  0.00  0.39 0.33  0.63  0.23 
Santa Catarina  11.79 0.05  0.48  0.02  0.37 0.32  0.57  0.28 
São Paulo  35.91 0.05  0.39  0.04  0.45 0.19  0.62  0.23 
Sergipe  25.02 0.13  0.20  0.06  0.25 0.15  0.46  0.12 
Tocantins  16.50 0.08  0.12  0.01  0.20 0.13  0.42  0.13 
Brasil   28.86 0.06  0.29  0.03  0.30 0.21  0.46  0.18 
Sources: DATASUS and SAEB – 2003. 
† The homicide rate in the first column was obtained from DATASUS and the violence indicators in the other 




The second limitation of violence indicators reported by school principals – the matter 
of subjectivity – arises from the design of the SAEB questionnaire itself. School principals 
must answer whether a given violent episode occurred or not in their schools during the 
academic year. Some events are remarkable and therefore a case for notification (e.g.: 
attempts on life). On the other hand, some other events rely on the perception of violence by 
the school principal or on his/her involvement in the school community, as in cases of 
physical assault and presence of drug use and/or dealing within or near schools.  
On account of this scenario, it is quite understandable that there is difference in the 
violence indicators obtained by SAEB as opposed to those provided by other sources. In fact, 
while the states of Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro, for instance, have a higher rate of 
homicide victims per 100,000 inhabitants, according to DATASUS data, these are the states 
with the lowest number of public schools that report on the presence of drugs within their 
premises or in their surroundings (Table 3). The states of Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do 
Sul, however, have very low homicide rates, but a quite large number of public schools that 
report on violence compared to other Brazilian states, as also shown in Table 3. These 
examples show how subjective indicators are. In the first situation, it is as if violence were an 
integral part of people’s daily lives and thus its evidence goes unnoticed by school principals. 
In the second situation, however, we perceive school principals give better attention to violent 
episodes, perhaps due to the lack of safety indicated by uncommon events.  
Even though the violence indicators reported by school principals do not accurately 
measure the dimension of this problem in Brazilian schools, they show the sensitivity of such 
schools to the problem. Therefore, our aim is to assess the relationship between violence 
perception and school outcomes, since sensitivity to violent events causes changes in 
students’ behavior and consequently affects their performance in school.  
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
 
The aim of this study is to assess how violence in schools affects the proficiency of 
students. Thus, the dependent variable is the student’s performance in Mathematics or in 
Portuguese, depending on the subject he or she was evaluated in, and the regressors of interest 
are violence indicators or variables that possibly increase or reduce the correlation with it: 
teacher’s qualification, differences between teacher and student in terms of sex and race, 
number of students in class, percentage of boys, percentage of non-white students, lag 




Obviously, we controlled for several characteristics regarding students, teachers, classes and 
schools. The descriptive statistics of all variables used are shown in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. 
In what follows, we describe how we built the variables of interest and we explain 
why we included them. First, we built a school violence index, our major variable in this 
study. For simplification, we just added the several violence indicators.
2 As each indicator 
assumes value zero or one and we have seven indicators, our index ranges between zero and 
seven, where zero represents the lowest level and seven stands for the highest level of school 
violence. Note also that teacher’s qualification was represented by three indicators: college 
education, graduate education, and experience (if he or she has more or less than 10 years of 
experience). We included these variables to capture the direct positive effects of teacher’s 
qualification and to investigate whether more qualified teachers manage to reduce the 
negative correlation of violence with proficiency, either by means of implementing innovative 
pedagogical projects or by approaching and dealing with violence problems at school.  
The difference between teacher and students’ characteristics was represented by two 
indicators: sex difference and racial difference. Each indicator assumes value one when any 
difference exists and value zero, otherwise. We included these variables for two reasons: (i) to 
check whether the difference in these dimensions causes detachment between teacher and 
student, compromises student learning and consequently, worsens student proficiency, as 
demonstrated in the literature,
3 and (ii) to assess whether this difference increases the negative 
correlation of violence, since it may trigger conflicts between the parties involved.  
The number of students in class on the day of the SAEB
4 survey was included in order 
to contemplate the widely investigated effect of class size
5 and to check whether a larger 
number of students in class increase the negative correlation of violence with proficiency due 
to the probable formation of rival subgroups and occasional conflicts between them.  
The percentage of boys in class was included for two reasons: (i) to assess the direct 
effects of male students on the individual proficiency of students, as boys often show poorer 
interest and disrupt the class environment more often, and (ii) to check whether the presence 
                                                 
2 Alternatively, we have also constructed an indicator that is a weighted average of school violence indicators, 
where the weights were chosen based on principal component analysis. However, results tended to be quite 
similar to those based on the simple sum of indicators. 
3  For further details, see Ehrenberg, Goldhaber and Brewer (1995), Ferguson (1998) and Dee (2004, 2005).  
4  Class size is measured in two different ways: the amount of students on the roll call and the number of students 
that attended class on the day of the SAEB survey. We used the second one because it contemplates possible 
changes in class size throughout the year, which arise from enrollment or dropout. Nevertheless, we are aware of 
the problem regarding school absenteeism, which may be included in this measure. 




of more boys in class increases the negative effect of violence on proficiency due to the fact 
that male individuals seem to be more aggressive. Actually, if we raise the rather strong 
hypothesis that the characteristics of homicide victims represent those of murderers 
themselves, we have the following violence pattern, according to DATASUS data: 93.62% of 
the homicide victims aged between 15 and 24 years, in 2003, were male.  The percentage of 
non-white students in class, however, was taken into consideration (i) to check whether the 
racial composition of class has a direct effect on the individual proficiency of students, as 
highlighted by the literature on social interaction,
6 and (ii) to investigate whether this 
percentage increases the negative effects of violence on student performance, since the social 
stereotype produced by interracial prejudice can trigger conflicts in the classroom. 
We also included the percentage of repeaters in class.  Our goals were (i) to tackle the 
deterioration in student performance caused by the lag between age and grade in the 
classroom, as pointed out by the literature,
7 and (ii) to check whether classes consisting of 
different-aged students (repeaters are older for obvious reasons) increase the negative 
correlation of violence with proficiency due to conflicts that could arise from different 
interests.   
Finally, we included the percentage of students with a poor family background, 
represented by two variables: the percentage of students who benefit from the study 
allowance granted by the government (cash transfer program called “Bolsa-Escola”), and the 
percentage of working students. We included these variables (i) to investigate whether the 
socioeconomic level of students influences their individual performance, as suggested by the 
literature on social interactions
8, and (ii) to check whether the sociocultural distance of the 
class from the syllabuses taught in schools increases the negative correlation of violence due 
to the conflicts of interest that might arise in this situation. In fact, Brazilian schools often 
prioritize encyclopedic syllabuses in the educational process that are not directly applicable to 
the work environment, and quite often, too far from students’ everyday life. 
As our goal is to show the association between school violence and student 
proficiency and as some regressors of interest interact with violence, we estimated the 
following equation: 
 
(1)    ics ics s ics s ics ics I V I V X Y ε δ γ β α + + + + = ) * .( . ' . . ' ) ln(  
                                                 
6  See, for instance, Card and Rothstein (2007), for recent evidence. 
7  See, for instance, Ferrão, Beltrão and Santos (2002) and Machado (2005).  





where ) ln( ics Y  is the logarithm for the proficiency of student i, of class c and of 
school  s;  ics X  represents all the control variables: characteristics of students, teachers, 
groups and schools;  s V  is the index of school violence; and  ics I  stands for all regressors 
described above: teacher’s qualification, teacher-student differences in terms of sex and race, 
number of students in the group, percentage of boys, percentage of non-white students, lag 
between age and grade in the class, and percentage of students with a poor family 
background. Since our objective was to check how each explanatory variable is related to 
student proficiency, both in the mean and in certain quantiles of proficiency distribution, we 
estimated the coefficients of equation (1) using linear regressions and quantile regressions. 
The coefficients of greater interest are β ,  γ  and δ . Each coefficient of δ  measures the 
impact of a regressor of interest on the correlation of school violence with student 
proficiency.  
If we restrict the coefficients of interactions to zero and if β  is negative, then students 
from schools with higher violence rates or from more violent neighborhoods show worse 
proficiency. By letting coefficients δ  free, if β  decreases in absolute values or becomes 
nonsignificant and some coefficient of interaction is significant and positive, then that 
variable that interacts with violence reduces the negative correlation between violence and 
proficiency. Suppose that the variable of interaction is teacher’s qualification. Thus, 
coefficient δ  measures the impact of a qualified teacher on the correlation of school violence 
with student proficiency. If the coefficient of this interaction is positive and significant, then 
better qualified teachers are able to implement teaching projects that minimize the negative 
correlation between violence and proficiency. On the other hand, if β  increases in absolute 
values and some coefficient of interaction is significant and negative, then that variable which 
interacts with violence enhances the negative correlation between violence and proficiency. 
Consider, for instance, the interaction of the number of students in a class with violence. If the 
coefficient of this interaction is negative and significant, then the deleterious effects of 
violence are bigger in larger classes, enhancing the negative correlation. 
However, one should highlight that the coefficient of the violence rate must be 
interpreted with caution. Actually, there might be an endogeneity problem between school 
violence and student proficiency that could arise through the simultaneity of relations and/or 
through the omission of relevant variables. The simultaneous relationship can occur when school 




same time, the worst performance stimulates violent actions in the school environment. The 
rationale for the latter argument is as follows: students with poor school performance tend to 
have fewer opportunities in the job market; consequently, they feel more encouraged to 
engage in criminal acts and, therefore, performing violent actions at school is just one more 
criminal behavior.  
With regard to the omission of relevant variables, one should recall that the admission 
of students to a school is a non-random family decision process, and that the maintenance of 
students in school depends on how attractive the school is. Parents who are more concerned 
with the education and safety of their children may prefer to enroll them in better and safer 
schools, despite the higher fees,
9 and can participate more actively in school management. 
Furthermore, safer schools with better teaching quality tend to attract and maintain highly 
motivated students. Nevertheless, we should note that students who do mind about violence 
and who cannot attend these schools wind up quitting. This makes the worst schools, with 
higher violence rates and poorer teaching quality, concentrate the least diligent students and 
those who are less sensitive to violence. In econometric terms, parent’s preference for better 
teaching quality and for safer schools and the attraction of best students to safer schools bring 
about an endogeneity problem, because this affects both school violence indicators and 
student proficiency. In other words, better and safer schools tend to concentrate students with 
higher proficiency and better violence indicators. This eventually overestimates the negative 
correlation between violence and proficiency. Nonetheless, the dropout of students from the 
most violent schools, who are more sensitive to violence, tends to minimize the correlation 
between violence and proficiency. Because there seems to be more factors in favor of the 
concentration of more proficient students in safer and more attractive schools, we believe 
overestimation must be a predominant feature. 
Even though we do not manage to deal with the simultaneity problem, we have sought 
to ease the problem with omitted variables by including five SAEB 2003 variables that may 
be used as proxies for school management, parent’s participation in this process and in the 
school life of their children, and school attractiveness. The variables are the following: 
number of times the school board meets during the year,
10 presence of fences or a wall around 
the school, average level of education of students’ mothers at a given school, percentage of 
households with electrical power supply, and percentage of students of a group that miss on 
                                                 
9 At first, this argument seems inappropriate for public schools, but we may think, for instance, of the cost of 
attending a school that is located farther away. 
10 Inexistence of a school board was considered together with the category entitled “existence of a school board, 




the day of tests. The frequency of school board meetings demonstrates the quality of school 
management: the more the school board members – principals, teachers and parents – meet to 
discuss and try to solve the problems faced by the school, the better the parent’s follow-up of 
the teaching-learning process will be and the more efficiently resources will be allocated. As a 
matter of fact, the presence of fences or a wall around the school may reflect parent’s pressure 
for investments in safety. The mothers’ educational background denotes the participation of 
mothers in decisions at the school level and in the follow-up of the school life of their 
children: we believe better educated mothers tend to be more demanding in parent’s meetings, 
for instance. The percentage of households with electrical power supply reflects the level of 
social commitment of the community to which the student belongs: the more pressure for 
public services is brought to bear by the community, the more comprehensive and the better 
the services will be. According to the spillover effect, local schools are expected to come 
under this social pressure. Finally, the percentage of students who fail to attend school on the 
day of SAEB test indicates how unattractive the school is. Schools with the worst teaching 
quality and with little concern about the academic follow-up of students are expected to suffer 
more terribly from dropout and/or school absenteeism. By including these variables, we hope 
the correlation between violence and proficiency will have a closer effect to the real effect of 
violence on schools. 
Besides showing the association between school violence and student proficiency, we 
also want to demonstrate the relationship between school violence and teacher turnover. That 
is, we want to show that not only does school violence has a direct effect, but that it is also 
indirectly associated with student performance as a result of teacher turnover. By the way, a 
study undertaken by UNESCO in 2000 clearly revealed that one of the possible consequences 
of school violence on the quality of teaching arises from teacher turnover (Abramovay and 
Rua, 2004). As teachers seek to get transferred to safe schools, there are job openings at the 
most violent schools, which consequently lead to detrimental discontinuity of the teaching-
learning process. This results in worse student performance. 
Since the number of teachers a given class has had throughout the year (variable 
included in the database) is a potential proxy for turnover, then we can estimate how our 
violence variables are related to this number. It should be highlighted that, although the 
distribution of this variable across public and private schools is quite similar, we use only 
information on public schools. Only in them we can associate the number of teachers 
throughout the academic year with turnover, as only in these schools does only one teacher 




more than one teacher: one example is Portuguese, which can be taught by three teachers – 
one who teaches grammar, one who teaches literature and one who teaches writing. After 
these remarks, we built a dependent variable categorized as follows:  
 
– 0, if the class did not have a teacher during the academic year;  
– 1, if the class had only one teacher during the academic year (normal circumstance); 
and 
– 2, if the class had more than one teacher during the academic year (turnover).  
 
We used the multinomial logistic model to estimate how violence indicators are 
associated with the probability of a class having no teacher, one teacher, or two or more than 
two teachers during the academic year. Again, we controlled for the characteristics of the 
class and of the school, as shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. The probabilities in the 


























































We calculated the impact of marginal changes in violence indicators on 
probabilities j P . The marginal effects (percentage variations in the probability of an event 
occurring when a given independent variable is modified) are calculated based on the 
estimated coefficients  ) ˆ (β , as shown in what follows: 
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When the variable is discrete as, for example, a school violence indicator, the marginal 
effect measures the difference between the probability of violence having occurred or not at 
that school. On the other hand, when the regressor is continuous, the marginal effect measures 









4.1. Direct relationship between violence and proficiency 
 
In table 4, we provide the estimation results for equation (1) using the school violence 
indicator. We specified four models. In the first one, we controlled for the characteristics of 
students, teachers, classes and schools, but we did not deal with omitted variables. In the 
second one, we added variables that aimed to minimize this problem: the number of times that 
the school board met during the year, the presence of fences or walls around the school, the 
average level of maternal education at a given school, the proportion of students’ households 
with electric power supply, and the percentage of students that missed class on the day of the 
test. In these two models, we did not include interactions of violence index. Our goal was to 
capture the correlation of violence without worrying about possible factors that could either 
mitigate or stimulate it. In the third model, we included interaction of the violence index with 
teacher’s attributes. Here, we were interested in knowing whether the teacher-student 
difference and teacher’s qualification influenced the correlation coefficient of school violence 
with student proficiency. Finally, in the fourth model, we excluded the interactions of the 
violence index with the teacher’s attributes and included the teacher’s interactions with class 
attributes. Our aim was to verify how the number of students and class configuration could 

















Table 4: School violence and student proficiency 
Ln(proficiency)  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Teacher-student difference in terms of sex -0.00571**  -0.00557**  -0.00481 -0.00550* 
  (0.00284) (0.00284) (0.00502) (0.00283) 
Teacher-student difference in terms of race  -0.01523*** -0.01553*** -0.01465*** -0.01551*** 
  (0.00315) (0.00314) (0.00511) (0.00314) 
Teacher with college education  0.00805 0.00082 0.00615 0.00263 
  (0.00771) (0.00780) (0.01206) (0.00783) 
Teacher with graduate degree   0.00954*** 0.00827**  0.01083** 0.00767** 
  (0.00329) (0.00328) (0.00548) (0.00328) 
Teacher with less than 10 years’ experience    0.00082  0.00315 0.00385 0.00295 
  (0.00329) (0.00329) (0.00549) (0.00329) 
Number of students in the class   0.00030  -0.00019  -0.00020  0.00059* 
  (0.00021) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00032) 
Percentage of boys in the class   -0.00002  -0.00016  -0.00016  0.00023 
  (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00019) 
Percentage of non-whites in the class  -0.00104*** -0.00085*** -0.00085*** -0.00091*** 
  (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00014) 
Percentage of repeaters in the class  -0.00035***  -0.00023**  -0.00023**  -0.00051*** 
  (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00016) 
Percentage of students with “Bolsa-Escola”   -0.00027*  -0.00015  -0.00015  0.00012 
  (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00021) 
Percentage of working students  -0.00059*** -0.00042*** -0.00042*** -0.00024 
  (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00016) 
School violence index  -0.00526***  -0.00474***  -0.00095  0.00942* 
  (0.00092) (0.00092) (0.00482) (0.00502) 
Interaction of violence index with :            
Difference in terms of sex       -0.00036    
       (0.00166)    
Difference in terms of race       -0.00030    
       (0.00168)    
College education       -0.00294    
       (0.00474)    
Graduate degree       -0.00099    
       (0.00176)    
 Less than 10 years’ experience       -0.00029    
       (0.00171)    
Number of students          -0.00031*** 
          (0.00011) 
Percentage of boys          -0.00017*** 
          (0.00007) 
Percentage of non-whites          0.00003 
          (0.00004) 
Percentage of repeaters          0.00010** 
          (0.00004) 
Percentage of students with “Bolsa-Escola”         -0.00010 
          (0.00006) 
Percentage of working students          -0.00007* 
          (0.00004) 
Correction for omitted variables   No  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Number of observations  48,880 48,880 48,880 48,880 
F( k-1, n-k)  146.62 140.13 131.08 129.48 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R




As shown in Table 4, the main coefficient of interest – school violence – is negative 
and significant in the specifications estimated without the interactions. The coefficient shows 
us that, on average, the occurrence of an additional violent event at a given school is 
associated with a reduction of approximately 0.47% in student proficiency. Actually, before 
we correct the omitted variables problem, the coefficient was a bit higher (0.53%), supporting 
our assumption about the overestimation of the effect of school violence due to the 
concentration of the most proficient students at safer and more attractive schools. 
At first, the correlation between school violence and student proficiency seems to be 
negligible. However, given that the index encompasses seven violence indicators, this means 
that the deterioration in proficiency between the least violent school and the most violent one 
corresponds to approximately 3.3%. Still, as the effects found in the literature of the impact of 
educational inputs on student performance are too small, violence seems to be relevant. This 
result is in line with the findings of the study conducted by UNESCO, showing that school 
violence contributes to worsening student performance. They also indicate that, apart from 
affecting the level of education, as pointed out by Grogger (1997), violence also undermines 
the quality of learning for those who stay in school.  
It is interesting to examine which violence indicators have the most harmful effects on 
student performance in Brazilian public schools. Table 5 provides the coefficients for the 
estimation of the second specification (with correction for the omission of relevant variables) 
by replacing the violence rate with the indicators it comprises. By using these estimates and 
the descriptive statistics in Table 3, we show that the main problem at schools regarding 
violence is the presence of drug dealing and/or consumption in their premises. As a matter of 
fact, students who attend schools that face such problem tend to have a 1% lower proficiency, 
and nearly half of Brazilian schools have notified this problem, and in some states this 
accounts for 60% of schools, as is the case of São Paulo (see Table 3). Therefore, fighting off 
drug dealing at schools must be one of the major concerns of public policymakers. Another 
indicator that has a quite detrimental effect on student proficiency is the presence of weapons 
at schools, with a coefficient of -0.6%. As 21% of school principals report concealed carry of 
firearms and/or of stabbing weapons (knives, pocket knives, stylets, etc.) by school members, 
this is also alarming. So, policies targeted at disarming the population may have good effects 
on student learning, and may also deter homicides and other types of violence. Finally, we 
have the robbery indicator, whose coefficient is the highest (-1.4%). Nevertheless, as only 3% 
of Brazilian public schools have reported on this type of violence (3%), this seems to be a 





Table 5: School violence indicators and student proficiency  
 
Ln(proficiency) Coefficient SE 
Attempt on life  -0.00620  0.00472
Theft   -0.00122  0.00335
Robbery -0.01442** 0.00591
Physical assault  -0.00155  0.00344
Presence of weapons -0.00629*  0.00347
Presence of drugs  -0.00929** 0.00362
Gang attacks  -0.00399  0.00363
                                          Source: SAEB 2003. 
                                          Robust standard errors (SE). 
                                          ***significant at 1%  **significant at 5%  *significant at 10% 
 
It should be stressed that this negative correlation of violence with proficiency might 
reflect both the offending behavior of youths and their status of victims. We know that in the 
eighth grade of middle school several students make decisions about job opportunities: if they 
do not get a job in the conventional job market, they might indulge in illegal activities such as 
drug dealing, for instance. If they opt for this, they begin to act violently and, consequently, 
they start committing offenses even at school, compromising their learning and that of their 
peers. In an attempt to separate the aggressive status from that of victim in our estimates, we 
performed the same regressions for the fourth grade of elementary school. We believed that 
violent behavior would be less likely in this age group and therefore, if there was any harmful 
effect of violence, this would be that of victim. The coefficient for school violence in this 
school grade was absolutely lower than that found for the eighth grade and for the senior 
grade of high school, but it was positive, contrary to our expectations, and significant.
11 
Despite the unexpected sign, this coefficient seems to indicate that there is no victim status in 
our estimates for the eighth grade and for the senior grade of high school: young people’s 
aggressiveness and its spillover effect appear to determine our results, as in the model 
proposed by Lazear (2001). 
When we interacted the violence index with teacher’s attributes – teacher-student 
difference in terms of sex and race, college education, graduate education and experience –, 
none of the coefficients was statistically significant, as shown in Table 4. In other words, we 
did not find any evidence that sex or racial differences between teachers and students 
maximize the deleterious effect of violence, or that teacher’s qualification might reduce the 
                                                 




negative correlation between school violence and student proficiency. Moreover, the 
coefficient for the violence index was no longer significant.  
Even though the correlations of the violence index with teachers’ attributes are not 
significant, Table 4 shows that these attributes have direct effects on student performance. 
Students who attend classes taught by teachers with a graduate degree, for instance, have a 
1% higher proficiency. The teacher-student differences in terms of sex and race, on the other 
hand, hamper student performance by 0.5% and 1.5%, respectively, being consistent with the 
evidence provided by Ehrenberg, Goldhaber and Brewer (1995), Ferguson (1998) and Dee 
(2004, 2005). The explanation for this phenomenon lies in what the literature denominates 
passive and active effects of a teacher. Passive effects arise from the simple identification 
between teacher and students resulting from their belonging to the same race, sex and/or 
socioeconomic background: they do not involve any kind of behavior on the part of the 
teacher. The presence of a teacher from a different race, for example, might influence 
students’ expectations and motivations and hinder the healthy interaction between teacher and 
students that stimulates learning. At the same time, the relationship between a male teacher 
and a female student, for instance, might cause unease due to stereotypes and undermine 
teaching-learning interactions. In turn, active effects arise from different behaviors of teachers 
towards students of a different race, sex and/or socioeconomic background. Prejudice often 
leads teachers to segregate some students, interfering with the teaching-learning process. With 
regard to public policies, this means that the qualification of teachers from the same 
community to which students belong, for example, may be efficient in improving education. 
When we correlated the school violence index with class size and class characteristics, 
in the fourth specification of Table 4,
12 we found strong evidence that the number of students 
in the classroom and the percentage of male students intensify the deleterious effect of 
violence, although the coefficients are not so important economically. Thus, evidence 
seemingly suggests that the larger the number of students in the classroom, the most likely the 
formation of subgroups and the existence of conflicts between them and, consequently, the 
stronger the correlation in absolute terms between violence and school performance. Another 
possible mechanism whereby the size of a classroom may potentiate the harmful effect of 
school violence on proficiency is the difficulty teachers have controlling very big groups. 
Regarding the role of the percentage of male students in the classroom in strengthening the 
negative correlation between violence and proficiency, recall the data provided by 
                                                 
12 Note that we excluded the correlations of the violence index with teacher’s attributes in this specification 




DATASUS, according to which 93.62% of homicide victims aged 15 to 24 years, in 2003, 
were male. Assuming again that the characteristics of homicide victims reflect the attributes 
of murderers, perhaps a very plausible hypothesis, we can say that boys are more aggressive 
and therefore it is natural that the larger number of male students ends up enhancing the 
detrimental effect of violence. 
Another remarkable correlation in the fourth specification in Table 4 concerns the 
school violence index with the percentage of working students. Despite its small economic 
importance, this percentage also seems to increase the deleterious effect of violence. A 
possible explanation to this fact is the existence of competing interests between working 
students and teachers with respect to the syllabuses taught in class. In general, workers want 
classes that are more closely linked to the working environment whereas teachers would 
rather teach more propaedeutical classes. Another explanation is the problem students have 
juggling studies and work: these students may show difficulty keeping up with the class due 
to their feeling tired and not being understood by their teachers. Both conflicts of interest may 
encourage discussions and fights at schools and, as a result, heighten the harmful effect of 
violence. The last significant interaction concerns the percentage of repeaters. However, the 
coefficient sign was different from that which we expected. We expected the number of 
repeaters in a class to be associated with greater disruptive behavior, as these students usually 
happen to be the most undisciplined, and consequently, this would increase the negative 
correlation between violence and proficiency. In fact, estimates indicate quite the contrary: 
they suggest that the percentage of repeaters lessens the effect of school violence. Maybe this 
is due to the experience these students acquire for having flunked, a hypothesis we regard as 
plausible but not so defensible. To conclude this analysis, the correlations of the school 
violence index with the percentage of non-whites and with the percentage of students who 
benefit from the study allowance granted by the government (“Bolsa-Escola”) were not 
statistically significant. 
It is interesting to have a look at the close relationship between the characteristics of 
the class and students’ proficiency. Curiously enough, we did not find striking evidence for 
the widely documented class size effect, nor for the expected negative correlation between the 
percentage of male students and proficiency. Among the analyzed attributes, only the 
percentage of non-white students, of repeaters, and of working students yielded significant 
coefficients. Albeit economically nonsignificant, these negative coefficients suggest the 
presence of harmful peer effects arising from racial, educational and economic issues. The 




teachers, as we explained previously, causing educational losses to the whole class. On the 
other hand, the spillover effect of the percentage of repeaters can be justified by the low 
educational background of these students, by the fact that they are potentially more 
undisciplined and by the difficulty the teacher has in conducting a teaching project that meets 
the interests of students whose age differences are quite large. The peer effects arising from 
the percentage of working students can be explained by the conflict of interests between 
teachers and students. As we argued previously, working students prefer classes that are more 
closely related to their working environment whereas teachers often follow strictly 
propaedeutical teaching manuals. Furthermore, as these students juggle work and study as 
part of their daily routine, they might have some difficulty keeping up with classes and 
accomplishing the tasks requested by the teacher. This combination of factors results in 
rowdier and slower classes, which is eventually negative to the whole group.  
Another characteristic of the class that deserves attention is the percentage of students 
who benefit from the study allowance granted by the government (“Bolsa-Escola”). Albeit 
weak, there is evidence that the presence of several of these students in a classroom may be 
detrimental to the performance of the group as a whole. A possible explanation to this fact is 
the conflict of interests between students who have just joined the schooling system and those 
who have already been attending school. As newcomers often do not understand the subject 
matter due to their poor background, the classes may have a slower pace and negatively affect 
the learning of other students. In this situation, make-up classes for students who benefit from 
the study allowance granted by the government may help circumvent the problem. Another 
plausible explanation refers to the violent reaction of students who have just entered school to 
the stigma they suffer because of their low socioeconomic background. As described by 
Sposito (2001), these stigmatized students may start to tease other students, obtruding 
themselves by instigating fear or physical force, turning the classroom into a less than 
adequate environment for learning.  
All the results presented above are average. However, there may be heterogeneity in 
students’ response to violence. Better motivated students tend to be less influenced by factors 
that negatively affect learning. In order to investigate these possible differences in the 
association between violence and student proficiency in the proficiency distribution, we 
carried out quantile regressions using a specification that includes all controls (attributes of 
students, teachers, schools and groups), including also the variables that try to make up for the 
omission of relevant variables, and the violence index. As shown in Table 6, violence seems 





Table 6: Impact of school violence on student proficiency in the proficiency distribution 
 
Quantile 
(proficiency) Coefficient SE 
0.05 -0.00577***  0.00201 
0.10 -0.00497***  0.00149 
0.25 -0.00464***  0.00095 
0.50 -0.00526***  0.00083 
0.75 -0.00408***  0.00083 
0.90 -0.00354***  0.00086 
0.95 -0.00409***  0.00100 
OLS -0.00474***  0.00092 
                                       Source: Saeb 2003. 
                                       Robust standard errors (SE). 
                                        ***significant at 1%  **significant at 5%  *significant at 10% 
 
In fact, the negative correlation of violence with proficiency decreases by 
approximately 29% when we move from the first to the last decile. This means that, in the 
first decile of the distribution, there is a proficiency difference of 3.5% when we compare the 
most violent school with the least violent one and, in the last decile, this difference drops to 
2.5%. Thus, violence appears to increase the inequality observed in student performance.  
 
4.2. Indirect relationship between violence and proficiency: teacher turnover  
 
When we assessed the direct relationship between violence and student proficiency in 
the previous section, we included, in the regression, the average number of Portuguese and 
Math teachers that each eighth grade and senior grade of high school had throughout the 
school year. Our goal was to check whether there was some harmful effect of teacher turnover 
on student performance. Even though the coefficient turned out to be negative in the four 
specifications estimated, it was not statistically significant in either of them. Notwithstanding, 
we decided to investigate whether there existed some association between school violence and 
teacher turnover. If there were a negative correlation, then violence could also affect student 
proficiency in an indirect manner. As we explained in the Methodology section, we used the 
number of teachers the classes had throughout the year as turnover parameter and we 
analyzed our problem by estimating a multinomial logistic model.   
As shown in Table 7, the marginal effects of the violence index suggest that school 
violence is associated with a lesser probability of groups having only one teacher and with a 
greater probability of having two or more teachers, although these effects were not 




comprises, we find strong evidence of the association suggested by the violence index. 
Actually, the presence of physical assault at schools during the academic year and the 
presence of drug dealing and/or consumption in their premises reduce the probability of 
classes having just one Portuguese teacher during the academic year by approximately 38%, 
and increase the probability of teacher turnover by around 6.5%. These rates confirm the 
findings of the study conducted by UNESCO that school violence negatively affects teachers’ 
motivation and may prompt them to leave violent schools.  
Table 7: Impact of school violence on teacher turnover 
 
Portuguese   Math  Variable #  of  teachers 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
0 0.00542  0.00387 0.00138  0.00371 
1 -0.06069  0.03699 -0.06991  0.04697 
Violence 
index 
2 or more  0.00830  0.00636 0.00976  0.00710 
0 0.01545  0.02288 0.02039  0.02549 
1 0.52264***  0.19828 -0.15252  0.21711 
Attempt 
on life 
2 or more  -0.09267***  0.03327 0.01793  0.03257 
0 -0.01218  0.01427 -0.01061  0.01262 
1 -0.04250  0.16364 0.16374  0.18265  Theft 
2 or more  0.01073  0.02776 -0.02153  0.02757 
0 0.02169  0.03037 0.00742  0.02488 
1 0.07286  0.25852 -0.13612  0.30430  Robbery 
2 or more  -0.01763  0.04375 0.01844  0.04562 
0 -0.01045  0.00936 -0.01655*  0.00885 
1 -0.36604**  0.14608 -0.16954  0.16651 
Physical 
assault 
2 or more  0.06510***  0.02479 0.03050  0.02468 
0 0.01752  0.01136 0.00054  0.00961 
1 0.22753  0.16224 -0.07353  0.18079 
Presence 
of 
weapons  2 or more  -0.04351  0.02736 0.01088  0.02724 
0 0.01058  0.01198 0.00924  0.01091 
1 -0.39958***  0.15084 0.07546  0.17872 
Presence 
of drugs 
2 or more  0.06421**  0.02556 -0.01424  0.02678 
0 0.02143*  0.01123 0.02655**  0.01138 
1 -0.13655  0.17614 -0.28078  0.17747 
Gang 
attacks 
2 or more  0.01698  0.02970 0.03512  0.02650 
             Source: Saeb 2003. 
             Robust standard errors (SE). 
             ***significant at 1%  **significant at 5%  *significant at 10% 
 
Teachers’ reaction to threats to their physical well-being seems natural, but their 
reaction to the presence of drugs at schools is surprising. Besides the deleterious effect on 
student learning, as pointed out in the previous section, drug dealing and/or consumption 
seems to strongly interfere on teachers’ daily work. In fact, if students are involved in drug 
dealing or if they are customary drug users, they feel more powerful to coerce teachers to 




meet their demands. Moreover, curfews, shootouts and riots are quite common in 
neighborhoods ruled by drug pushers, rendering working conditions too risky.   
Another school violence indicator with remarkable marginal effects concerns attempt 
on life, but the signs of these effects are different from those expected. At first, it seems 
unreasonable that the presence of this violent event at a given school will increase the 
probability of a group having only one teacher throughout the academic year and reduce the 
probability of teacher turnover, but given the severity of the episode, we can understand this 
result. The threat to someone’s physical well-being at a given school tends to discourage 
attendance to that school: teachers, for example, may ask to get transferred and may not be 
replaced due to violent events. Therefore, there must an increase in the probability of a group 
not having any teacher during the academic year, as the marginal effect suggests, although it 
is not significant, but not in the probability of that class having several teachers throughout 
the year. 
It should be highlighted that violence indicators only had a remarkable impact on the 
turnover of Portuguese teachers. Initially, we assumed the existence of a driving force acting 
in this direction and another force acting in favor of the turnover of Math teachers. The 
former is the largest relative percentage of women among Portuguese teachers, as women 
appear to be more sensitive to violence, as suggested by the DATASUS data on victims. The 
latter concerns the lack of Math teachers in the job market, which gives these teachers a 
greater bargaining power and eventually motivates them to change schools. Both the larger 
relative percentage of women among Portuguese teachers and the lack of Math teachers are 
supported by real-world situation, as will be outlined ahead, but apparently the first effect 
predominates. 
As shown in Table 8, the percentage of women among Portuguese teachers exceeds 
80%, whereas this rate falls to 55% among Math teachers. According to DATASUS, 93.62% 
of homicide victims aged 15 to 24 years,  in 2003, were male. Assuming again that the 
characteristics of homicide victims mirror the attributes of murderers, which is perhaps a 
strong though plausible hypothesis, we may say that women are more sensitive to violence 
and, therefore, it is natural that they respond more often to violent events. In this specific case, 
they respond by changing schools.  
 
 





Subject %  men  %  women 
Portuguese 17.32  82.68 
Math 44.07  55.93 
     Source: SAEB 2003. 
 
The lack of Math teachers can be described as follows: if the cost in terms of diligence 
required from a undergraduate course in Mathematics is higher and if the salary paid to public 
school teachers is the same for all subjects, a rational individual is expected to choose to teach 
any other subject, unless his/her preferences and skills in Math are sufficiently strong. Thus, 
wage equality of public school teachers implies that the only variable of adjustment in this 
market for Math teachers refers to the quality of working conditions. That is, if this scarcity 
were actually present, Math teachers would have more options to move from more violent 
schools to less violent ones and consequently there would be a greater turnover of these 
teachers. As we do not have enough data on the number of Math and Portuguese teachers in 
the Brazilian job market, we used two indirect indicators. The first one consisted of the total 
number of undergraduate students about to graduate in Languages and in Mathematics in 
2003 (data from INEP-Provão), representing a flow indicator: 34,600 versus 15,025, a 
difference of 130%. The second indicator consisted of the total number of candidates enrolled 
in the competition exams for middle and high school teachers in the state of São Paulo in 
2003, representing a stock indicator: 60,631 for Portuguese versus 39,091 for Math, a 
difference of 55%. As, in general, the number of Portuguese and Math classes is the same in 
elementary schools, both indicators confirm our hypothesis of the lack of Math teachers. 
However, as we could already observe, the relative percentage of women among Portuguese 
teachers seems to predominate. 
Finally, in order to check whether there is actually a relationship between school 
violence and a higher probability for teachers to get transferred from schools, we ran a logit 
whose dependent variable corresponds to each teacher’s desire to change schools and the 
covariates are their own characteristics, characteristics of the groups they teach and of the 
schools where they work and some school violence variable.
13 The marginal effects show that 
the violence index is positively related to the teachers’ probability to change schools. But 
when we replace this index with the indicators it comprises, we note that attempt on life and 
presence of drugs guide the result of the violence index, as shown in the table below.  
 
                                                 




Table 9: Impact of school violence indicators on the probability of a teacher changing schools 
 
Variable Coefficient SE 
Violence index  0.00823*  0.00492 
Attempt on life  0.04898*  0.02793 
Theft   -0.02386  0.02040 
Robbery 0.05077  0.04552 
Physical assault  -0.01384  0.02044 
Presence of weapons  0.00515  0.02066 
Presence of drugs  0.03972**  0.01931 
Gang attacks  0.00817  0.02056 
                                        Source: Saeb 2003. 
                                         Robust standard errors (SE). 
                                          ***significant at 1%  **significant at 5%  *significant at 10% 
 
Once again, we note the effect of drug dealing and/or consumption on teachers’ lack 
of motivation. As previously outlined, the presence of drugs at schools seems to strongly 
interfere with teachers’ daily work routine. 
 
5. Final remarks 
 
More often than not, the mass media report on the occurrence of several violent events 
within or outside school premises. Is there any direct relationship between violence in these 
schools and worse student performance, controlling for characteristics of the students and of 
the teaching staff and for the infrastructure of these schools? Moreover, is there any indirect 
association between violence in these schools and student performance, which includes 
teachers’ loss of motivation? In this study, we investigated these questions and showed that 
students who attended more violent schools usually had a worse performance on SAEB 2003 
tests, even when the attributes of students, classes, teachers and schools were controlled for. 
We also found evidence that violence affects more students at the lower tail of the proficiency 
distribution. In addition, we found out that, besides this direct relationship between school 
violence and proficiency, there seems to be an indirect association between these variables 
that operates by means of teacher turnover. We showed that the occurrence of violent events 
at a school is negatively correlated with the probability of groups having only one teacher 
during the academic year, and positively associated with the probability of these groups 
having problems with teacher turnover. For all these results, one should emphasize the 
deleterious effect of the presence of drugs at schools: drug dealing and/or consumption seems 




Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that these associations should be interpreted 
with caution: as we pointed out, there may be endogeneity in the association between school 
violence and student proficiency arising from the simultaneity of relationships between these 
variables and/or by the omission of relevant variables, such as parent’s preference to enroll 
their children in less violent schools. Thus, it is necessary to consider the limitations of the 
results obtained in this study regarding the proposition of public policies against school 
violence. Bearing this in mind, we can only say that policies that try to reduce school 
violence, such as the Escolas de Paz (Schools of Peace) program in Rio de Janeiro, or the 
Escola da Família (School for the Family) program in São Paulo, might be efficient in 
improving the quality of teaching. Also, policies targeted at combating drug dealing may 
improve student learning, either due to the direct effects on the school environment or by the 
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7.1. Construction of school violence indicators 
 
Part of SAEB 2003 questionnaire for school principals: 
 
Yes No Yes No
130. Attempt on teachers and/or school workers' lives within school limits (A) (B) (C) (D)
131. Attempt on students' lives within school within school limits (A) (B) (C) (D)
132. Teachers and/or school workers were victims of larceny within school limits (A) (B) (C) (D)
133. Students were victims of larceny within school limits  (A) (B) (C) (D)
134. Teachers and/or school workers were victims of violent robbery within school limits (A) (B) (C) (D)
135. Students were victims of violent robbery within school limits  (A) (B) (C) (D)
SCHOOL VIOLENCE
During this academic year, the following facts happened
External Agent 




Never Sometimes Always Never Sometimes Always
146. Consumption of illicit drugs within school limits (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
147. Consumption of illicit drugs in the surroundings of  the school (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
148. Drug dealing within school limits (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
149. Drug dealing in the surroundings of the school (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
Internal Agent 
(a school member)
During this academic year the following events were or were not 
common
(not a school member)
External Agent 
 
    
During this academic year the following events were or were not common Yes No
150. School members carrying fire guns (A) (B)
151. School members carrying cutting weapons (A) (B)
152. Gangs acting within school limits (A) (B)
153. Gangs acting in the surroundings of the school (A) (B)  
 
Yes No Yes No
155. Physical agression toward a teacher (A) (B) (C) (D)
157. Phisical agression towards students (A) (B) (C) (D)
Student Teacher






– Intermediate violence indicators: 
 
– Questions 130-135: 1, if the principal answers (A) or (C) 
                                               0, if the principal answers (B) and (D) 
 
– Questions 146-149: 1, if the principal answers (B), (C), (E) or (F)   
                0, if the principal answers (A) and (D) 
 
– Questions 150-153: 1, if the principal answers (A)                                         
      0, if the principal answers (B) 
 
– Questions 155 and 157: 1, if the principal answers (A) or (C) 
                                                      0, if the principal answers (B) and (D) 
 








Table A1: Descriptive statistics (Proficiency) – Students 
 
Variable Sample  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Proficiency 48,880 248.24 49.44 97.55  455.64
Male 22,483 0.46 0.50 0.00  1.00
White   23,671 0.48 0.50 0.00  1.00
Age   48,880 16.48 2.14 12.00  22.00
Number of bathrooms  48,880 1.29 0.64 0.00  3.00
Number of rooms  48,880 2.40 0.69 0.00  3.00
Number of vehicles  48,880 0.57 0.76 0.00  4.00
Refrigerator   46,408 0.95 0.22 0.00  1.00
Washing machine  33,921 0.69 0.46 0.00  1.00
Maternal education  48,880 6.52 4.09 0.00  15.00
Repeater 17,677 0.36 0.48 0.00  1.00
Study allowance from the government  2,381 0.05 0.22 0.00  1.00
Working student  16,866 0.35 0.48 0.00  1.00
State school  40,010 0.82 0.39 0.00  1.00
Municipal school  8,603 0.18 0.38 0.00  1.00
Federal school  267 0.01 0.07 0.00  1.00
Shift: Morning  21,494 0.44 0.50 0.00  1.00
Shift: Morning/Afternoon  324 0.01 0.08 0.00  1.00
Shift:  Afternoon  12,274 0.25 0.43 0.00  1.00
Shift: : Afternoon/Evening  612 0.01 0.11 0.00  1.00
Shift:  Evening  14,176 0.29 0.45 0.00  1.00
8th grade of middle school   29,582 0.61 0.49 0.00  1.00
Senior grade of high school  19,298 0.39 0.49 0.00  1.00
Subject: Portuguese  24,661 0.50 0.50 0.00  1.00
Subject: Math  24,219 0.50 0.50 0.00  1.00
Teacher: different sex  23,529 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Teacher:  different race  20,601 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
Teacher:  level of education 47,659 0.98 0.16 0.00 1.00
Teacher:  graduate degree 22,166 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Teacher: : up to 10 years’ experience 17,545 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
Teacher: : Ln(salary)  48,880 3.59 0.53 1.79 5.95
Group: number of teachers in academic year  48,880 1.15 0.38 0.00 3.00
Group: Number of students in the classroom  48,880 27.17 8.00 1.00  58.00
Group: % men  48,880 46.25 12.67 0.00  100.00
Group: % non-whites  48,880 51.65 21.71 0.00  100.00
Group: % repeaters  48,880 37.21 20.74 0.00  100.00
Group: % students with study allowance  48,880 4.84 11.23 0.00  78.38
Group: % working students  48,880 34.80 22.48 0.00  100.00
Group: % absenteeism on the day of SAEB test  48,880 22.35 18.32 -328.57  97.56
School: Ln(principal’s salary)  48,880 7.36 0.47 5.48  8.25
School: cleaning of classrooms  43,665 0.89 0.31 0.00  1.00
School: photocopier  18,773 0.38 0.49 0.00  1.00
School: number of school board meetings  48,880 2.53 0.93 0.00  3.00
School: fence or wall around school  40,417 0.83 0.38 0.00  1.00
School: average maternal education  48,880 6.40 1.86 1.33  13.90
School: % households with electric power supply  48,880 98.37 3.67 25.00  100.00




TableA1: Descriptive statistics (Proficiency) – Students (Cont’d) 
 
Variable Sample  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
School: violence index  48,880 2.52 1.79 0.00 7.00 
School: attempt on life  5,816 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
School: theft  26,738 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
School: robbery  2,230 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
School: physical assault  20,905 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00 
School: presence of weapons  15,089 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
School: presence of drugs  34,914 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 
School: gang attacks  17,329 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Rondônia  284 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Acre  132 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Amazonas  1,238 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Roraima  137 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Pará  1,196 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Amapá  123 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Tocantins  368 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Maranhão  1,251 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Piauí  641 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Ceará  2,942 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Rio Grande do Norte  814 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Paraíba  812 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Pernambuco  1,782 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Alagoas  514 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Sergipe  405 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Bahia  2,622 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Minas Gerais  6,239 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Espírito Santo  978 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Rio de Janeiro  3,081 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
São Paulo  12,342 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Paraná  3,142 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Santa Catarina  1,169 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Rio Grande do Sul  2,889 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Mato Grosso do Sul  731 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Mato Grosso  937 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Goiás  1,353 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Distrito Federal  758 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Metropolitan region  18,973 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
City with 200,000 inhabitants or over   4,716 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
City with less than 200,000 inhabitants  25,191 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 













Table A2: Descriptive statistics (Turnover) – Groups 
 
Variable Sample Mean SD  Min  Max
Number of Portuguese teachers in the academic year: 0  63 0.02 0.15  0.00  1.00
Number of Portuguese teachers in the academic year: 1  2,267 0.84 0.37  0.00  1.00
Number of Portuguese teachers in the academic year: 2 or 
more  381 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Number of Math teachers in the academic year: 0  60 0.02 0.15  0.00 1.00
Number of Math teachers in the academic year: 1  2,259 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00
Number of Math teachers in the academic year: 2 or more  392 0.14 0.35  0.00  1.00
Group: number of students in the classroom  2,711 25.23 8.03  1.00  58.00
Group: % men  2,711 46.58 13.27  0.00  100.00
Group: % non-whites  2,711 53.10 21.79  0.00  100.00
Group: % repeaters  2,711 40.61 21.64  0.00  100.00
State school  2,104 0.78 0.42  0.00  1.00
Municipal school  593 0.22 0.41  0.00  1.00
Federal school  14 0.01 0.07  0.00  1.00
Shift: Morning  1,077 0.40 0.49  0.00  1.00
Shift: Morning/Afternoon  18 0.01 0.08  0.00  1.00
Shift: Afternoon  683 0.25 0.43  0.00  1.00
Shift: Afternoon/Evening  32 0.01 0.11  0.00  1.00
Shift: Evening  900 0.33 0.47  0.00  1.00
8th grade of middle school  1,771 0.65 0.48  0.00  1.00
Senior grade of high school  940 0.35 0.48  0.00  1.00
School: Ln(Principal’s salary)  2,711 7.31 0.49  5.48  8.25
School: Cleaning of classrooms  2,376 0.88 0.33  0.00  1.00
School: Photocopier  1,011 0.37 0.48  0.00  1.00
School: Number of school board meetings  2,711 2.51 0.95  0.00  3.00
School: Fence or wall around school  2,221 0.82 0.38  0.00  1.00
School: Average maternal education  2,711 6.14 1.86  1.33  13.90
School: Number of household with electrical power supply 2,711 97.94 4.55  25.00  100.00
School: Violence index  2,711 2.43 1.80  0.00  7.00
School: Attempt on life  314 0.12 0.32  0.00  1.00
School: Theft  1,408 0.52 0.50  0.00  1.00
School: Robbery  117 0.04 0.20  0.00  1.00
School: Physical assault  1,161 0.43 0.49  0.00  1.00
School: Presence of weapons  830 0.31 0.46  0.00  1.00
School: Presence of drugs  1,862 0.69 0.46  0.00  1.00
School: Gang attacks  893 0.33 0.47  0.00  1.00



















Table A2: Descriptive statistics (Turnover) – Groups (Cont’d) 
 
Variable Sample  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Rondônia  17 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Acre  8 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Amazonas  67 0.02 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Roraima  8 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Pará  72 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Amapá  8 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Tocantins  24 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Maranhão  78 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Piauí  39 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Ceará  173 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Rio Grande do Norte  48 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Paraíba  47 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Pernambuco  101 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Alagoas  33 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Sergipe  23 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Bahia  158 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Minas Gerais  342 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Espírito Santo  55 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Rio de Janeiro  171 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
São Paulo  594 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Paraná  156 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Santa Catarina  70 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Rio Grande do Sul  199 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Mato Grosso do Sul  41 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Mato Grosso  58 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Goiás  86 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Distrito Federal  36 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Metropolitan region  981 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
City with 200,000 inhabitants or over  257 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
City with less than 200,000 inhabitants  1,474 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 






















Table A3: Descriptive statistics (Turnover) – Teachers 
 
Variable Sample  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Teacher intends to change schools 640 0.13 0.33 0.00  1.00
Male 1,528 0.31 0.46 0.00  1.00
White   3,260 0.65 0.48 0.00  1.00
College education  4,841 0.97 0.18 0.00  1.00
Graduate degree  2,242 0.45 0.50 0.00  1.00
Up to 10 years’ experience  1,856 0.37 0.48 0.00  1.00
Ln(hourly wage)  5,001 3.57 0.54 1.79  5.95
State school  3,899 0.78 0.41 0.00  1.00
Municipal school  1,076 0.22 0.41 0.00  1.00
Federal school  26 0.01 0.07 0.00  1.00
Shift: Morning  1,988 0.40 0.49 0.00  1.00
Shift: Morning/Afternoon  36 0.01 0.08 0.00  1.00
Shift: Evening  1,623 0.32 0.47 0.00  1.00
Shift: Afternoon  1,293 0.26 0.44 0.00  1.00
Shift: Afternoon/Evening  61 0.01 0.11 0.00  1.00
8th grade of elementary school  3,258 0.65 0.48 0.00  1.00
Senior grade of high school  1,743 0.35 0.48 0.00  1.00
Subject: Portuguese  2,528 0.51 0.50 0.00  1.00
Subject: Math  2,473 0.49 0.50 0.00  1.00
Group: Number of students in the classroom  5,001 25.05 8.01 1.00  58.00
Group: % men  5,001 46.55 13.26 0.00  100.00
Group: % non-whites  5,001 53.15 21.71 0.00  100.00
Group: % repeaters  5,001 40.46 21.62 0.00  100.00
School: Ln(Principal’s salary)  5,001 7.31 0.49 5.48  8.25
School: Cleaning of classrooms  4,431 0.89 0.32 0.00  1.00
School: Photocopier  1,854 0.37 0.48 0.00  1.00
School: Number of school board meetings  5,001 2.51 0.95 0.00  3.00
School: Fence or wall around school  4,080 0.82 0.39 0.00  1.00
School: Average maternal education  5,001 6.16 1.86 1.33  13.90
School: number of households with electrical 
power supply  5,001 98.05 4.29 25.00 100.00
School: Violence index  5,001 2.42 1.80 0.00  7.00
School: Attempt on life  579 0.12 0.32 0.00  1.00
School: Theft  2,601 0.52 0.50 0.00  1.00
School: Robbery  212 0.04 0.20 0.00  1.00
School: Physical assault  2,083 0.42 0.49 0.00  1.00
School: Presence of weapons  1,524 0.30 0.46 0.00  1.00
School: Presence of drugs  3,403 0.68 0.47 0.00  1.00
School: Gang attacks  1,689 0.34 0.47 0.00  1.00
















Table A3: Descriptive statistics (Turnover) – Teachers (Cont’d) 
 
Variable Sample  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Rondônia  34 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Acre  14 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Amazonas  134 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Roraima  16 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Pará  130 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Amapá  14 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 
Tocantins  44 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Maranhão  141 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Piauí  70 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Ceará  331 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Rio Grande do Norte  86 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Paraíba  87 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Pernambuco  185 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Alagoas  58 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 
Sergipe  41 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Bahia  264 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Minas Gerais  628 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Espírito Santo  107 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Rio de Janeiro  324 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00 
São Paulo  1,080 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Paraná  299 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Santa Catarina  137 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Rio Grande do Sul  358 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Mato Grosso do Sul  79 0.02 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Mato Grosso  104 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Goiás  140 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Distrito Federal  71 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 
Metropolitan region  1,814 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
City with 200,000 inhabitants or over  451 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
City with less than 200,000 inhabitants  2,736 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Source: Saeb 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 